Gate 1: source-statement fidelity, independently checked

What Gate E1 proves ●Implemented

For the controlled source representation and the committed adversarial corpus, the implementation can bind retrieved bytes to a canonical observation, independently verify those bytes in Go and in C, and deterministically extract a source-native statement plus an explicit semantic interpretation and a complete derivation record — while offline.

It also proves rejection behaviour for the bounded classes represented by the public vectors, and it proves that the local demonstration does not need the origin to remain available after observation. Those two properties are what make the evidence claim meaningful: a result that can be recomputed from stored bytes after the source is gone is a result that can be audited.

Everything on this page is copied from reports/gate-1-genesis.md↗, the committed evidence report. Where this page and the report disagree, the report is authoritative. The same figures are published as project-status.json.

The path it proves

1. Controlled originA local fixture server, not a production source. Loopback access is denied unless explicitly enabled.
2. Policy-constrained observationHTTP GET under an explicit URL policy with bounded time, size, redirects, and ports.
3. Content-addressed evidenceThe response body is stored under its SHA-256 digest and retrieved by that digest.
4. Deterministic CBOR envelopeRetrieval metadata is bound to the evidence digest in a canonical encoding with a normative CDDL schema.
5. Go verifier and independent C verifierTwo implementations validate the same envelope and body against the same committed vectors.
6. Origin stoppedThe fixture server is shut down. Nothing after this point may contact the network.
7. Deterministic offline extractionA manually admitted adapter reads the stored bytes. No shell, no network, no model.
8. Native statement and semantic viewThe provider's own term and lexical value are retained beside the transformed value.
9. Field-level provenanceEvery emitted field carries request URL, final URL, retrieval time, body and observation digests, adapter identity and digest, extraction method, locator, transform chain, and mapping relation.

Reproduce it

The acceptance sequence runs from a clean generated-artefact state and requires no public internet. Requirements are Go 1.23 or later (1.26 recommended), GCC with C2x support, Clang 17 or later for the sanitizer tests, plus Bash, Python 3, and curl.

git clone https://github.com/banga-agents/TWIRX.git
cd TWIRX

make clean && make build && make test && make demo

make test runs the normal Go tests, all four Go fuzz targets, the Clang ASan/UBSan C corpus, 5,000 libFuzzer executions, the offline end-to-end test, and the documentation navigation check. make demo observes the local fixture, verifies it in Go and C, stops the origin, and completes extraction from evidence.

Inspect a single result by hand

bin/tw observe --url http://127.0.0.1:18080/product/sku-001 \
  --out var/demo --cas var/cas --allow-loopback

bin/tw verify --observation var/demo/observation.cbor --cas var/cas
bin/tw-verify-c var/demo/observation.cbor var/cas

# This command does not contact the origin.
bin/tw extract --observation var/demo/observation.cbor --cas var/cas \
  --adapter adapters/testorigin-product/adapter.json \
  --out var/demo/result.json

The --allow-loopback flag weakens the public network policy for local fixtures only. It must never become an option on a public service.

Evidence record

The report is committed after the implementation it describes, so its own commit identifier is intentionally not the tested implementation identifier.

Toolchain and host

The repository has no go.sum, and this gate adds no third-party Go runtime dependency. A repository scan for common private-key, GitHub token, AWS access-key, and Slack token patterns returned no match outside generated directories and Git metadata.

Conformance totals

Static and hygiene checks

Race detector, go vet, gofmt, ShellCheck, Clang static analysis, secret scan, and the stopped-origin demonstration all passed. The C verifier was additionally built under both GCC and Clang with -Wall -Wextra -Werror -Wconversion -Wshadow -Wpedantic.

Fuzzing and sanitizers

Four Go fuzz targets and one C libFuzzer target ran clean. The independent verifier was compiled with -fsanitize=address,undefined -fno-omit-frame-pointer; ASan and UBSan emitted 0 findings. The parser-only C harness ran 5,000 mutations seeded by every shared observation vector without a crash or sanitizer finding. That harness performs no filesystem or network operation.

Coverage

Command packages report 0% because they have no direct Go tests; their current path is exercised by the shell end-to-end test and the demonstration. Adding CLI error-path tests is unresolved risk R6.

Benchmark scope

BenchmarkResolveJSONPointer-16  271.7 ns/op  128 B/op  8 allocs/op

Recorded on AMD Ryzen 7 6800U, Linux/amd64, 16 logical workers.

Remote CI status ×Not proven

GitHub-hosted Actions failed during check-suite startup before creating any job, so no intended CI command reached a runner.

The `ci` workflow is reported active with zero associated runs. Repository events are recorded against a separate deleted workflow with an empty name and no jobs. A byte-identical rename to ci.yaml, actionlint validation, disabling and re-enabling the workflow, and closing and reopening the pull request all reproduced the same startup failure.

Remaining cause: External to the workflow document: GitHub Actions availability, budget, or account eligibility for hosted runners on this private repository.

What Gate E1 does not prove

1. That provider content, a semantic mapping, or a retrieval timestamp is objectively true.
2. Publisher identity or authority.
3. Arbitrary websites, HTML, JavaScript, browser execution, model output, writes, payments, registry operation, or multi-tenant service.
4. Production DNS-rebinding resistance, egress isolation, or safe public arbitrary-URL deployment.
5. Signatures, release provenance, external transparency, or protection against a host compromise that replaces code and evidence.
6. The absence of parser defects. Finite tests and short fuzz runs cannot establish it.

Unresolved risks

Seven risks remain open against Gate E1. They are published here in full and unedited because a risk register that only appears in a repository file is a risk register designed not to be read.

1. URL and resolved-address checks are application-layer controls. Production deployment still needs separate worker and control networks, DNS and egress enforcement, metadata isolation, and quotas.
2. Observation v1 records the request and final URL but not the redirect chain or selected transport headers. A later immutable transport-evidence artifact is needed without mutating v1.
3. The adapter runtime has no independent second implementation. Its manifest and result formats remain pre-stable and unsigned.
4. Atomic publication is per file, not a transaction spanning every file in an observation bundle. Destination directories and CAS roots are assumed to be trusted configuration, and filesystem durability semantics vary.
5. The corpus is intentionally small and the fuzz durations in normal tests are smoke tests. Longer scheduled fuzzing and external review remain necessary.
6. Direct command-package coverage is absent even though the shell workflow exercises their current happy path. CLI error-path tests should be added at the next maintenance gate.
7. Local filesystem compromise can replace implementation and evidence together. Signed releases and external transparency are out of Gate 1.

R1 is expanded on the security page. R3 and R4 are admission conditions for later gates on the progress page.